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Introduction
In this paper we will look at sociological network analysis from the
point of view of recent developments in the philosophy of science.
Although at the moment network analysis represents an optimal way of
doing empirical work in sociology, we will argue that network analysis
still is in apremature state. We will corroborate this by analyzing its
formalism, cleavages, positions and organizations. It will become clear
that achievements so far do not cover an adequate, unified theory. We
do not intend to criticize mainly the approach. On the contrary: we are
looking for ways that may lead towards a comprehensive theory of
social networks. In doing so we will draw attention to the role played by
theoretical terms and underlying theories.
What is Network Analysis?
During the last two decades the body of writings on social networks
has been considerable. R.S. Burt (1980) gives the reader in his 'Models
The joint work at this paper was made possible by fellowships of the Netherland
Institute for Advanced Studies (NIAS).
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of Network Structure' a good survey with many references. Various
features are common to a1l:
1. There is a common use ofgraphs, matrices, networks etc. as pictorial .
models representing real, sociologically relevant features of the world.
The picture of a net e.g. consists of knots (representing persons or
groups) which are connected by lines (representing relations among
persons or groups). Various local or global features of such formal
networks in concrete situations correspond to clearly identifiable fea-
tures of human relations (given fixed interpretations of the knots and
lines in the net). H, for example, the lines denote a flow of information
from one person to another, and a net is such that a1l lines from one
person to any other are passing through one distinguished knot, then the
person denoted by that knot in the corresponding concrete situation has
complete control over any flow of information in the set of persons
considered.
2. Most authors assurne that the number of relations of a given type in
which a person or a group is involved is a grade of importance of that
person or group with respect to the given type of relation. If a person as
a friend (or other type of relation) has relations to thirty other persons
while another individual has such relations with only three other in-
dividuals then the former is more important in the system than the
lauer, and that special type of relation is more important for the former
as weIl. There are many investigations during which numbers of rela-
tions are counted. But counting is associated with measurement, and
thus with giving different 'weight' or 'importance' to different persons.
3. Most writings show an operationalist or behaviorist metaphysical
background. The very idea of interpreting graphs by means of persons
and their relations seems to be free of general, theoretical assumptions.
Persons can be directly observed; their relations are open to direct
inspection. The investigation can start with the analysis of overt
behavior.
4. A fourth feature, relevant to our discussion is also an item which may
be overlooked easily: The method of graphs is applied to different
situations or types of phenomena. Assumptions assumed to be valid in
those special contexts differ widely. There is no fixed set of assumptions
that is satisfied in all applications of the method.
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5. Last but not least there prevails among practitioners of network
methods a conviction that empirical conclusions (predictions) are the
outcome of relations among different networks. However, we cannot
predict individual behavior or individual relations knowing only that a
certain individual is a member of a certain network. Predictions regard-
ing future events are as a rule based on the knowledge of how different
networks to which this individual belongs can be brought into line, and
how they are interrelated.
These features appear as a paradigm in the sense of Thomas Kuhn.
Sociological network research can be clearly identified and delineated.
It is not necessary, however, to engage in mapping the above features
on conditions as described by Kuhn.! His characterizatio[1s are much
too weak and too ambivalent, and of minor importance to our present
considerations.
On the other hand it is quite clear that the afore-said features are not
sufficient to meet with the demands of a theory. It is common to all
theory-concepts which are discussed in the literature that a theory
consists - among other things - of a certain vocabulary (basic notions),
and some axioms and assumptions (sentences formulated in the
vocabulary).2 None of the above mentioned features indudes proper
axioms, perhaps with the exception of the axioms characterizing
mathematical graphs.
We might try to introduce a system ofaxioms or a dass of models for
network theory. However, from the point of view of recent develop-
ments in the philosophy of science this would not yield an adequate
picture. For network theory is a comprehensive theory, and the picture
of comprehensive theories which has emerged recently is that of a
theory-net3 , consisting of a set of 'little' theories or laws (as the knots of
the net) together with a specialization relation between those laws
(representing the lines), expressing that one law is a specialization of
another one. In such a net there is one distinguished knot which repre-
l.
2.
3.
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of the models and the axioms are represented by a corresponding dass of models.
Compare Balzer & Heidelberger, 1983 for the different theory-concepts available.
Compare Balzer & Sneed, 1977/78.
ON THE METHODOLOGY OF NETWORK ANALYSIS
sents the basic laws or assumptions of the theory, that is, those assump-
tions which hold in all applications of the theory. Usually, such basic
laws are rather trivial due to the fact that they are valid in so many
different applications of very different nature. Examples are Newton's
second law as the basic law of classical mechanics, and MaxweIl's
equations as the basic law of electrodynamics. The basic laws constitute
a kind of general frame which guides the search for speciallaws. Special
laws are laws which are valid only in a subset of the set of all applications
of the theory, they only apply to special systems. Hooke's law e.g. does
not hold for very great values of stress: It does not give a complete
description of the elastic behavior of a substance. Different speciallaws
are 'bound together' by being specializations of one common basic law.
This assures that the same basic notions are applied in all cases, and
therefore that the different applications, in fact, belong to one theory.
We believe that this picture of theory-nets is also relevant for network
theory. That is, a satisfactory account of network theory is likely to
exemplify some basic laws for sodal networks holding in general as weIl
as further special laws being characteristic for special applications
(focussing in special features like cleavages, positions, etc.).
Usually, the establishment of a paradigm leads to the introduction of a
general theory. At least this is what we learn from the history of science.
If this is true then in the case of network analysis, tOD, we should expect
the development and introduction of a comprehensive theory having all
or most of the present, various applications as special cases. Such a
theory, comparable to, say Newtonian mechanics, in classical physics, is
what we would call a mature theory or a mature state of network
analysis. It is in this sense that we claimed network analysis still to be in a
premature state. This simply means that there does not yet exist a set of
basic axioms for network theories in general such that the various
different applications can be obtained by specializations of the general
axioms.
We will now turn to more special issues which, we think, are of rele-
vance for the construction of such a comprehensive theory.
Enlarging the Formalism
Tbe formalism inherent in the picture of mathematical graphs or
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networks imposes some restrictions which cannot be expected to be met
in all examples.
A first restriction is that only binary relations are used. The picture of a
graph in which each line always connects two points with each other,
and also the mathematical definition of a graph as a set of ordered pairs
(eventuaIly with additional properties) can only be interpreted as repre-
senting binary relations. 'X is a friend of Y' and 'X and Y work together'
are typical examples. But it is clear that relations of different types occur
in reality and are important as weIl. Consider for instance the relation
'X is a child of Y and Z' or 'X is a business partner of Y and Z'. These are
ternary relations which certainly might be relevant in certain contexts,
but which cannot be reduced to binary ones. 4 A more <2omplicated
example involving economical concepts would be 'X at texchanges
quantity A of commodity i against quantity B of commodity j'. This
example also would necessitate a change of the interpretation of the
knots in the net: knots would represent persons, equipped with certain
quantities of kinds of commodities at certain times.
What can be seen from these examples is the foIlowing: There are other
relations, relations with more than two argument-places, which are
important and do not seem to be reduceable to binary ones. The
application of network analysis in cases where such relations are present
cannot be adequately depicted by means of graphs in the present
interpretation. In the present interpretation the picture of knots and
lines between them indicates that aIl relations among the knots can be
analyzed in terms of binary relations. But this does not fit with sociologi-
cal reality. There are relations which have to be represented by more
than two knots which, together with lines among them, form an in-
separable unit.
This is not to say that we are in favor of giving up the graphical
representation of social networks as graphs. We simply want to point
out that in general this method is too restrictive. So, in order to formul-
ate a general theory of social networks, the concept of a mathematical
4. This is not meant as a non-possibility claim in any strict logical sense. Often, logics
reveals. P?ssibilities which were not discovered by common sense, and it usually is
very .dlfficult to substantiate and to 'prove' non-possibility results of the kind
menuoned.
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graph cannot be a constitutive element. As a rule one is obliged to use
the abstract concept of a relational structure, as a structure consisting of
one or several set(s) of 'objects' together with various relations (or
functions) of various argument-places. Relational structures can be
precisely understood as structures for many-sorted, higher order
languages in the sense of formallogics. 5
A second restriction which we find unnecessary is the restriction to
types of relations such that the number of relations of a given type in
which a person is involved indicates some weight. Of course, in special
cases relations of the same type may add up to something very impor-
tant. But mere counting of relations seems to be a rather blind method.
As a rule, quantity is no substitute for quality. We conclude that the
matrix formalism which is frequently used in order to handle quantita-
tive aspects as given by numbers of relations represents only a special
device working nicely in some special cases.
Finally, what is still missing are systematic investigations about relations
across different nets. Let us compare the situation with lattice theory. In
a lattice there are (in general) various possibilities for sub-Iattices, and
much theoretical work has been devoted to the investigation of relations
among sub-Iattices. Similar investigations are necessary in the field of
network analysis. There certainly is a vast area ofdifferent types or ways
of how networks can overlap and can be combined. Certainly there will
be standard configurations which are especially relevant to sociological
applications, for example with respect to the kind of qualitative predic-
tions derived from the way in which different networks overlap for one
person.
Theoretical Terms
Before tuming to cleavages, positions and organizations we draw
your attention to that body of generalizations and principles known as
'theoretical terms' as developed in association with practice, because
recently this concept underwent a metamorphosis.6
5. Compare Bourbaki, 1968, pp. 262 for precise definitions. There, relational struc-
tures are called "structures of species S on the principal base sets EI,' ., En with AI'
.. , Am as auxiliary base sets".
6. Compare Balzer, 1983, Sec. V, for a precise presentation ofthe new definition of
theoretical terms.
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Traditionally, 'theoretical terms' were regarded as terms which are not
'observable'. They had a derived status, their use was justified only
insofar as they could be reduced in meaning to, or defined by, 'non-
theoretical' terms. The weH known difficulties of this reductionist pro-
gram which started in logical empiricism, led to a directing of the
attention toward single, isolated theories. In a given theory we can draw
a similar distinction. Some terms of the theory may be treated as
observable with respect to that thel)ry, that is, their meaning can be
determined either 'directly' or by means of other theories, but without
the help of the theory in question. On the other hand, one might call a
term 'theoretical' in a given theory if it cannot be determined without
using the theory itself. It turns out that this idea can be made precise by
requiring that a theoretical term is one which is 'weakly deftnable' in a
theory, that is, if at least in some models of the theory the term's
denotation is uniquely determined by means of the other terms' denota-
tions. More precisely, the picture is this. In a model ofthe theory each
term has adenotation or interpretation. Let us call term 1's denotation
in model x the relation ofx associated with 1. Then t is weakly definable
in theoryTifthere are models x ofTin which the relation ofx associated
with t is uniquely determined by the other relations of x (Le. the
relations of x associated with T's other terms), and by x being a model of
T.
'Weak definability' in this sense has to be 'contrasted with the usual
concept of explicit definability. The central difference is that an explicit
definition guarantees the term's eliminability in all contexts in which the
theory applies, Le. in aH models of the theory. This is not so for 'weak
definability'. A term may be 'weakly definable', but still, in some
applications of the theory, it may not be eliminable. For there may be
applications which are represented by models in which the denotation
of the term is not uniquely determined.
It may be objected that this notion of 'weak definability' is in fact so
weak that aH terms will be weakly definable, even the non-theoretical
ones. In order to prohibit this triviality it is necessary to use a notion of
definition slightly stronger than that of 'weak definability'. What we
have in mind is a concept which might be called 'definability in the range
of invariance of the theory'. This notion is technically a bit involved and
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oeed not be presented here. 7 The only important point for us is that
there is a completely precise distinction (which can be fulIy formalized),
and that this distinction in case of 'real-life' theories turns out to be
identical with what commonly is accepted as the distinction between
theoretical and non-theoretical terms. The basic property oftheoretical
terms which folIows from this definition is that they can be determined
by means of the theory under suitable conditions, but usualIy not in
general, i.e. not in alI applications. Non-theoretical terms - in contrast
- cannot be determined at all by means of the theory under considera-
tion. They have to be presupposed as 'given', and they acquire their
meaning in other theories, different from the one under consideration.
We note that in a certain way those othertheories which are necessary in
order to give some meaning to theory T's 'non-theoretical' terms may be
said to be theories underlying T. By applying the distinction between
theoretical and non-theoretical terms in each ofT's underlying theories
we obtain further theories underlying the former, namely those in which
the non-theoretical terms of the former theories acquire their meaning.
And so on. In this way the new definition can be used to trace back and
to reconstruct the web of theories underlying one particular, given
theory T.
Cleavages
A cleavage may be defined as a partition of a population into two or
more subsets. Sometimes the subsets are required to be disjoined and
exhaustive, but these requirements do not seem to be regarded as
essential by all authors.
Often, cleavages ·are operationally defined. That is, there are given
criteria which, if applied, yield adecision about whether or not an
individual belongs to one of the subsets of the partition. For example, if
the cleavage consists of two religious groups then a criterion for some
individual to be member of one group might simply consist in its being
inscribed in one of the commons. The operation by means of which we
7. See Balzer, 1983, Sec. V. What is called a 'term definable in the range of invariance
of the theory' here is called a 'T-theoretical term' in the paper mentioned.
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decide on membership in this case is to check the various books of the
different commons.
If treated in this operationalist way there is no intrinsic connection
between the relations of a social network and cleavages. Cleavages are
then regarded as being detectable independently of social relations
among individuals. But there is also the opposite view according to
which cleavages are and have to be explicitly defined in terms of the
relations of a social network. The idea is that among the individuals
belonging to one common subset of the cleavage there are certain
characteristic relations which do not obtain in other subsets of the
cleavage or across the subsets. Consideration of examples, however,
shows that such definitions usually are not feasible. How should we
define, for instance, a person's being member of a religiouscommunity
merely in terms of that person's individual relations? Or, to take
another example, how should we define a person's being member of the
'working class' merely in terms of that person's relations to other
individuals. We certainly will find relations indicating such a member-
ship, for example frequent contact with the respective priest, or no
contact with the owner of the factory, but such indications can never
serve as general definitions. In our view both these extreme cases,
namely treating cleavages as operationally defined or as explicitly
definable in terms of relations, are inadequate. The right way to look at
the concept of a cleavage is to regard this concept as a theoretical term.
That is, the concept of a cleavage is not in general (Le. for all possible
applications) definable in terms of relations, but it is weakly definable in
some special applications. There exist special applications of the net-
work approach in which it is possible under further special assumptions
in fact to define cleavages in terms of the relations under consideration.
But such a definition will not be adequate in other applications of the
network approach.
A theoretical term in the sense introduced in the previous section can
occur only in a proper theory. So the term 'cleavage' can - properly
speaking - be theoretical only in some network theory which, as
indicated earlier, still does not yet exist. Nev~rtheless, the idea of
cleavages being theoretical may serve as a guide or constraint in setting
up such a theory.
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Positions
What has been said about cleavages applies mutatis mutandis to
positions, too. Positions are distinguished places in society connected
with special roles, obligations, rights etc. Again, we have two extreme
possibilities. On the one hand we may regard a position as operationally
defined by means of certain criteria. For instance, we can say that the
position of a head of department is defined by certain contracts and
regulations of law. In order to find out whether some individual keeps
such a position we have to apply the operation consisting of checking
whether all relevant contracts and regulations in fact apply to this
person.
On the other hand there is the idea of a general definition ofpositions in
terms of network relations. Positions are then defined abstractly as
equivalence classes of networks with a special internal structure. For
instance, we might consider a network consisting of four individuals and
lines among individuall and i for i = 2,3,4. In such a concrete net we
can say that individual number 1 occupies a distinguished concrete
position. This position will be the same in all nets isomorph to the
original one. So ifwe consider the equivalence class of all nets isomorph
to the original one we may say that this equivalence class expresses the
position under discussion in an 'abstract' way.8
Again, we think that both views, namely of positions as being opera-
tionally defined or as being explicitly defined are inadequate. Positions
- like cleavages - are theoretical with respect to network theory. That
is, in special applications of the theory (which still has to be properly
formulated) it will be possible to determine or to define in a weak sense
certain special positions, but this determination does not work in all
applications of the theory.
Organizations
Organizations are difficult to define, and we will not try to elaborate
on one of the common characterizations. We think that all of them are
8. Two networks are isomorph if there is a unique correspondence between the set of
knots of the one network and the set of knots of the other network. That is, if two
knots in the one network are connected by some line then their images in the other
network are also connected by some line.
279
W. BALZER & H.D. FLAP
deficient in various respects. Instead, it seems more adequate to start
with clearcut examples. Typical examples are firms in the productive
sector, units of bureaucracy (Iike ministeries, departments of ad-
ministration), churches, unions, police divisions, courts, as well as small
enterprises run by a family.
Here again, we have the possibilities of either defining organizations
operationally in a way independent of the relations among the in-
dividuals involved or by explicitly defining organizations in terms of
social relations.
The first alternative will essentially work with criteria using distinctions
from economics, politics, and law. For instance, a firm might be charac-
terized as an abstract actor which pursues profit by means ~f producing
commodities in a certainsetting governed by a special political frame
and by speciallaws. Especially in the sphere of law organizations are
often treated as person of law so that many authors use
anthropomorphic terms like 'corporate actor' instead of the term 'orga-
nization'. A moment's reflection shows that operational characteriza-
tions like the one just mentioned hardly provide more than a first, rough
orientation. All the terms involved in the characterization are highly
problematic and unclear. The problem of what is an actor straightfor-
wardly leads into the theory of action with all its dependencies on
psychology and philosophy of language. The concept of profit leads into
problems of economics, not to speak abouf the political frame and the
law. Of course, one might envisage a theory of organizations as forming
the top of a little hierarchy of theories (or sciences) consisting of
psychology, economics, philosophy, political science, and law, to men-
tion only the most important parts. But the practical implications of
such a picture are severe. A proper theory of organizations would
essentially rely on all its underlying theories, as listed above, and
therefore always would rely in its quality and degree of precision on the
quality and precision of its underlying theories.
This situation yields an argument for the second possibility which con-
sists of explicitly defining organizations in terms of the relations of the
individuals involved. Intuitively, this idea is simple and attractive. After
all, real life organizations essentially consist of human beings which
behave according to certain, rather strict rules, among which various
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essential relations hold. This picture avoids also to rely too much on
other, underlying theories. Even in organizations, social relations can
be directly observed, and thus the observational basis for a theory of
organizations based on human relations need not rely on other social
sciences. However, this approach does not exist. At the moment, some
first, small steps are made in that direction. This may have several
reasons. First, the number of relevant relations in an organization
usually is rather large, and the relations themselves cover quite different
aspects of human life. For instance, the spectrum of relations may range
from economic relations of exchange (of commodities against money,
or norms against money, or rights against information and so on) on the
one hand to strictly delineated relations of power (like the power to give
orders of a certain form to certain persons, to be obliged to deliver
certain informations, to have the right to apply for certain things and so
on).
Second, these various kinds of relations may have to combine in certain
specific ways in order to yield an organization. Even the personal
enemies of some bureaucrat may use their right to apply to certain
things via this person. The political opinions of somebody working in a
firm may be tolerated as long as the person contributes efficiently to the
firm's goals. And so on. It is clear that this is a big field for research, and
in the frame of the present paper we cannot do any general theoretical
proposals. However, we want to suggest that the concept of an orga-
nization, too, has or should have the status of a theoretical term in
network theory. In certain simple organizations, like the family en-
terprise, one would expect the possibility of a weak definition of such an
organization in terms of the relations of the persons involved. But such a
weak definition certainly will not do in general for all applications of
network theory. The larger the organization the more difficult it will be
to achieve a complete characterization in terms of sodal relations.
So the terms 'cleavage', 'position' and 'organization' all are and should
be theoretical terms of network theory. A network theory with such
theoretical terms seems to represent a rather substantial extension of
the present state of affairs. Network analysts may think of this as a too
grandiose program. But against this attitude we want to point out that
the three concepts under discussion are central for any of the more
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interesting theoretical propositions in sociology. Cleavages as macro-
distinctions exist and may be easily detected. By referring to such
distinctions sociology is freed from the pressure to start from the in-
dividualistic basis with all its difficulties and irregularities. Positions are
the right means to give social networks an interesting and non-trivial
structure which on the one hand is accessible to an understanding from
the point of view of the individual, and on the other hand is abstract
enough to allow for general patterns in various different applications.
Organizations, finally, perhaps represent the most characteristic fea-
ture of present societies. 9 A sociological theory neglecting organizations
will not be able to say anything interestingly which is typical for present
day societies.
Summary
It is argued that the network approach in sociology - which forms a
paradigm in the sense of T. Kuhn - does not yet constitute a mature
theory in the sense of modern philosophy of science. The present
achievements of the network approach are contrasted with distinct
features of mature theories, like e.g. their explicit form of so-called
'theory-nets' , or the distinction between theoretical and non-theoretical
terms. An outline of a new distinction between theoretical and non-
theoretical terms in a theory is given. The methodological status of the
terms 'cleavage', 'position' and 'organization' is discussed, and it is
argued that these three terms should have the status of theoretical terms
in a proper theory of social networks.
9. See for instance Coleman, 1974.
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